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Abstract— Deep neural network controllers for autonomous
driving have recently benefited from significant performance
improvements, and have begun deployment in the real world.
Prior to their widespread adoption, safety guarantees are
needed on the controller behaviour that properly take account
of the uncertainty within the model as well as sensor noise.
Bayesian neural networks, which assume a prior over the
weights, have been shown capable of producing such uncer-
tainty measures, but properties surrounding their safety have
not yet been quantified for use in autonomous driving scenarios.
In this paper, we develop a framework based on a state-of-the-
art simulator for evaluating end-to-end Bayesian controllers.
In addition to computing pointwise uncertainty measures that
can be computed in real time and with statistical guarantees,
we also provide a method for estimating the probability that,
given a scenario, the controller keeps the car safe within
a finite horizon. We experimentally evaluate the quality of
uncertainty computation by three Bayesian inference methods
in different scenarios and show how the uncertainty measures
can be combined and calibrated for use in collision avoidance.
Our results suggest that uncertainty estimates can greatly aid
decision making in autonomous driving.
INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have seen a surge in
popularity over the past decade, and their use has become
widespread in many fields including safety-critical systems
such as medical diagnosis and, in particular, autonomous
cars. The latter have driven millions of miles without human
intervention [1], [2], but offer few safety guarantees. This
has led to erroneous edge-case behaviours and unforeseen
consequences [3]. Thus, there is an urgent need for meth-
ods that are capable of accurately detecting, analysing and
diagnosing such erroneous behaviours.
A Bayesian Neural Network (BNN) is a neural network
with a prior distribution on its weights. BNNs have the ability
to capture the uncertainty within the learning model, while
retaining the main advantages intrinsic to deep neural net-
works [4]. As a consequence, they are particularly appealing
for safety-critical applications, such as autonomous driving,
where uncertainty estimates can be propagated through the
decision pipeline to enable safe decision making [5]. Con-
sider, for example, a self-driving car that, while driving, finds
an obstacle in the middle of the road. Then, the controller
may be uncertain on the steering angle to apply and, in order
to avoid the obstacle, may choose angles which turn the car
either right or left, with equal probability. Nevertheless, if
we consider the optimal decision according to this steering
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angle distribution and a squared loss, then the controller will
simply select the mean value of the distribution [6] and aim
straight at the obstacle. As we will show later (Definition 2),
having precise quantitative measures of the BNN uncertainty
facilitates the detection of such ambiguous situations.
In this paper we develop a novel framework for eval-
uating the safety of autonomous driving using end-to-end
BNN controllers, that is, controllers in which the end-to-end
process, from sensors to actuation, involves a single BNN
without modularisation. Our framework can be configured
with any simulator and assumes that trajectories can be
sampled efficiently and are endowed with a probability
measure. We demonstrate how to obtain a priori statistical
guarantees on the safety of the application of the BNN in a
given scenario. In particular, we consider both probabilistic
safety, which is the probability that the controller will keep
the car safe for a given time horizon, and real-time decision
confidence, which is the probability that the BNN is certain
of a given decision. By using concentration inequalities, such
as Chernoff bounds [7], we show that both measures can be
estimated with arbitrarily stringent a priori guarantees.
We evaluate our methods on experiments performed on
the CARLA driving simulator [8], where we consider a deep
end-to-end controller given by a modified NVIDIA’s PilotNet
(formally known as DAVE-2) neural network architecture
[9], which we train with three different BNN inference
methods, Monte Carlo dropout [10], mean-field variational
inference [11], and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo [12]. We con-
sider different training scenarios, including obstacle avoid-
ance and driving on a roundabout, demonstrating how to
quantify the uncertainty of the controller’s decisions and
utilise uncertainty thresholds in order to guarantee the safety
of the self-driving car with high probability. In summary, this
paper makes the following main contributions:
• We present a framework for evaluating safety of au-
tonomous driving with end-to-end BNN controllers,
which is based on a simulator and allows one to obtain
and quantify the quality of uncertainty estimates for the
controller’s decisions.
• We design a statistical framework for evaluating safety
of BNN controllers with high probability with a priori
statistical guarantees.
• We show that this statistical framework can be used
to evaluate model robustness to changes in weather,
location, and observation noise.
• We empirically demonstrate that our real-time statistical
estimates can be used to avoid a high percentage of
collisions.
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I. RELATED WORKS
Deep end-to-end controllers are rising in popularity as the
state-of-the-art method for autonomous driving. Examples
of such controllers include CNNs, [13] and [14], and fully
convolutional networks with long short term memory (FCN-
LSTM), [15]. Prior to end-to-end controllers, there is a
rich literature on detecting anomalies from sensor output
[16]; however, these methods deal with when sensor outputs
deviate from normal ranges and do not detect when the model
itself is unsafe. For this, quantification of model and data
uncertainty, extracted from BNNs, can be used [17].
To date, the advantages of BNNs have been observed in
small test cases. In [18], an ensemble of BNNs over different
modalities (stereo imaging and GPS) are used in order to
drive a 1:5 scale car around an oval track. Further, in [19],
they use bootstrapping and dropout in order to generate
uncertainty estimates which allow an RC car or quad-rotor
drone to predict and avoid collisions.
Beyond these simplified domains important work is being
done in scaling end-to-end BNN models to real-world test
cases. In [20], the authors use a BNN to incorporate GPS and
image data to make predictions about long term navigation
and localization. [21] looks at using uncertainty from a BNN
to produce both a distribution of possible future trajectories
of a car at an intersection, and a confidence estimate for
varying time horizons, with the final goal of augmenting the
result of this with a physics-based predictor using confidence
estimates. Additionally, in [22] BNNs are used on real-world
LiDAR data in order to more safely localize objects.
While these works do well to scale BNNs to more
pratical cases, they are not concerned with analysis of the
safety of deployment for BNNs. For this, very few works
have been completed. [23] looks at using statistical model
checking (SMC) to evaluate the probability of two different
subsystems of an autonomous vehicle controller (therefore
not an end-to-end controller) meeting specific key perfor-
mance indicators (KPIs). Although the results of this paper
demonstrated a high probability of meeting the KPIs, the
simulator used lacked realistic detail.
We further the investigation into safe deployment of BNNs
as end-to-end controllers by scaling exact and approximate
inference techniques to realistic simulators. This allows for
the contextualization of pointwise uncertainty estimates and
enables their use in real-time decision making. Understand-
ing that uncertainty increases for certain inputs (as in [20],
[22], [21]) is important insofar as it encourages the use
of uncertainty during deployment; however, evaluating the
uncertainty in a pointwise (per image) fashion does not allow
us to reason about emergent properties of the incorporation
of uncertainty and their safety [24]. In order to create safe
plans for autonomous vehicles that incorporate uncertainty,
we must evaluate the fundamental impact of decisions which
are made on the basis of uncertainty (e.g. slowing down when
uncertain, or returning control to the user).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Bayesian Neural Networks and Inference
For a test input o ∈ Rm a BNN with C output units and
an unspecified number (and kind) of hidden layers is denoted
as fw(o) = [fw1 (o), . . . , f
w
C (o)], where w is the weight
vector random variable. Given w, a weight sampled from the
distribution of w, we denote with fw(o) the corresponding
deterministic neural network with weights fixed to w and
with p(fw(o)) the resulting distribution of fw(o). In the case
of classification, we consider classification with a softmax
likelihood model. Let D = {(o, c) | o ∈ Rm, c ∈ {1, ..., C}}
be the training set. Then, we assume a prior distribution over
the weights, i.e. w ∼ p(w)1, so that learning for the BNN
amounts to computing the posterior distribution over the
weights, p(w|D), via the application of Bayes rule. Unfortu-
nately, because of the non-linearity introduced by the neural
network architecture, the computation of the posterior can-
not be done analytically [4]. Hence, various approximation
methods have been studied to perform inference with BNNs
in practice. Among these methods, we consider Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo (HMC) [12], Mean Field Variational Inference
(VI) [11] [25], and Monte Carlo Dropout (MCD) [10].
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) proceeds by defining
a Markov chain whose invariant distribution is p(w|D), and
relies on Hamiltionian dynamics to speed up the exploration
of the space. Differently from the two other methods dis-
cussed below, HMC does not make any assumptions on
the form of the posterior distribution, and is asymptotically
correct. The result of HMC is a set of samples wi that
approximates p(w|D).
Mean Field Variational Inference (VI) proceeds by find-
ing a Gaussian approximating distribution q(w) ≈ p(w|D)
in a trade-off between approximation accuracy and scala-
bility. The core idea is that q(w) depends on some hyper-
parameters that are then iteratively optimized by minimizing
a divergence measure between q(w) and p(w|D). Samples
can then be efficiently extracted from q(w).
Monte Carlo Dropout (MCD) is an approximate vari-
ational inference method based on dropout [10]. The ap-
proximating distribution q(w) takes the form of the product
between Bernoulli random variables and the corresponding
weights. Hence, sampling from q(w) reduces to sampling
Bernoulli variables, and is thus very efficient.
III. UNCERTAINTY QUANTIFICATION FOR AUTONOMOUS
DRIVING
In this section we first give a description of our framework
for evaluating BNN controllers and then introduce different
measures for safety characterization in self-driving cars. In
particular, in Definition 1 we define probabilistic safety,
which is the probability that a BNN controller will keep the
car safe, while in Definition 2 we define real-time decision
confidence as the probability that the BNN controller is
certain of its decision at the current time.
1Usually depending on hyperparameters, omitted here for simplicity.
A. Conceptual Description of our Framework
We model the autonomous driving scenario considered in
this paper as a discrete-time controlled stochastic process
(xk, k ∈ N) [26]. xk is a probabilistic model that describes
the status of the entire system and takes values in a state
space X , which includes information on the position, velocity
and acceleration of the car, as well as that of all the other
vehicles, pedestrians and obstacles on the map. Intuitively,
in this paper, xk just represents a white-box system that we
assume we can simulate arbitrarily many times.
The control space of the process, which represents the set
of variables a controller can modify to drive the behaviour of
xk, is denoted by U ⊆ Rm and is typically given by steering
angle, braking and acceleration values of the ego car. We
assume the controller can only observe a noisy image of the
state space coming from the available sensors. Hence, xk is
only partially observable. We denote by O the observation
space, which is the set of all possible observations. Intu-
itively, given the current state of xk, the controller receives
an observation of xk, o ∈ O, and synthesizes an action u ∈ U
based on this observation. Then, xk transitions to a new state
at time k+1. Given a the evolution of xk is probabilistic, as
traffic, weather conditions, and other variables are uncertain.
A (memoryless and deterministic) control strategy for xk,
pi : O → U associates to a given observation an action. In
this work, as explained in detail in the next section, we train
a BNN controller to synthesize pi. We denote a path of xk by
ω : N→ X ×U . ω is a sequence of states and actions in an
execution of the system. Given a strategy pi we assume there
exists a well defined probability measure over the paths of
x such that, for X ⊆ X , P (ω(k) ∈ X|pi) is the probability
that xk is in X at time k given pi. For instance, this measure
is well defined for POMDPs [27]. However, the uncertainty
quantification techniques derived in this paper will work also
for more general, possibly non-Markov, processes.
B. Safety Measures for Autonoumous Driving
The first problem we consider in Definition 1 is that of
computing the probability that a given strategy pi synthesized
by the BNN keeps the car safe. This probability can be
used for planning and to certify that a given controller is
safe with high probability given the available information.
Computing this value can be done in any simulator. Prior
to the deployment of an autonomous vehicle it is common
for large companies to evaluate the safety of specific test
cases [28]. As a consequence, we believe that a quantifiable
notion on the safety of a given controller is pivotal in order
to certify a controller, especially if this incorporates learning
elements.
Definition 1. (Probabilistic Safety) Let X ⊆ X be a safe
set, ω denote a path of xk, [0, T ] ⊆ N be a time horizon,
and pi be a given policy. Compute
η1 = P (φ1(pi, ω, [0, T ])),
where φ1(pi, ω, [0, T ]) = ∀k ∈ [0, T ], ω(k) ∈ X |pi
Then, for δ > 0, we say that pi is δ−safe in [0, T ] iff η1 ≥ δ.
η1 is satisfied if the probability that a path of xk is safe
during the interval [0, T ] is greater than a threshold. We
should also stress that similar probabilistic measures of safety
are widely used to certify cyber-physical system models [29],
[30].
As explained in greater detail in the next section, in order
to synthesize a control strategy pi, we train a BNN and
we obtain that, for an image o ∈ O, pi(o) is determined
by the BNN predictions. However, notice that pi(o) is still
deterministic. Hence, it does not take into account the
uncertainty in the model predictions, which is intrinsic in
the BNN and could be used to quantify the confidence of
the model in its decisions. To tackle this issue, for o ∈ O,
in the following definition, we consider a notion of trust of
pi(o) based on the probability mass of the BNN around pi(o).
The following problem is stated for regression tasks, but can
be trivially extended to classification problems.
Definition 2. (Real-time decision confidence) Given  > 0
let ok the observation received at time k, w a wieght sampled
from w, and Sok = {u ∈ U s.t. |u− pi(ok)| ≤ }. Compute
η2 = P
(
φ2(S
ok , fw(ok))
)
,
where φ2(Sok , fw(ok)) = fw(ok) ∈ Sok .
Then, we say that the decision at time k is δ−confident iff
η2 ≥ δ.
Note that the probability measure in the above definition
comes from the distribution of the weights in the BNN. In
fact, by definition of probability, we can equivalently write
η2 = Ew∼w[1fw(ok)∈Sok ], where 1E is the indicator function
for event E. Hence, real-time decision confidence, as defined
in Definition 2, seeks to compute the probability mass in a
−ball around pi(o) and classify a decision as certain if the
resulting probability is greater than a threshold. Definition
2 can be violated either when there is high uncertainty
(i.e., variance is large) or when the control distribution is
multimodal and the most likely mode of p(fw)(o) is far
from pi(o). In the experimental results section we show that
this measure of uncertainty can be employed together with
commonly employed measures of uncertainty, such as mutual
information [31], to quantify in real time the degree that the
model is confident in its predictions and can offer a notion
of trust in its predictions.
In the next subsection we consider a statistical framework
that allows us to compute the measures of Definition 2 and
1 with guarantees in terms of confidence intervals.
C. A Statistical Framework for Safety Evaluation
For the computation of η1 and η2, we consider a sta-
tistical framework, inspired by the techniques developed
for statistical analysis of probabilistic models [32], [33]. In
particular, we observe that the satisfaction of both φ1 and φ2
can be seen as Bernoulli random variables, which we can
observe by sampling from w, the weights of the BNN in
case of real-time decision confidence, and by sampling xk
in case of probabilistic safety. After we collect n samples of
each random variable, we can build the following empirical
estimators
ηˆ1 =
1
N
n∑
i=1
φ1(pi, ωi, [0, T ])
ηˆ2 =
1
N
n∑
i=1
φ2(pi(o), S
o, fwi(o)),
where {w1, ..., wn} are weights sampled from w and
{ω1, ..., ωn} are paths sampled from x. Then, for an arbitrary
absolute error bound 0 < θ < 1 and confidence 0 < γ ≤ 1,
we obtain that if
n >
1
2θ2
log
(
2
γ
)
, (1)
then for i ∈ {1, 2}, it holds that
P (|ηˆi − ηi| > θ) ≤ γ. (2)
The above bound is based on Chernoff bounds [7]. Neverthe-
less, also other sequential schemes, potentially requiring less
samples, could be employed [32]. However, the bound in Eqn
(1) has the advantage to allow one to determine the required
sample size n for a given precision before performing the
experiments. Hence, it can be trivially parallelized.
BAYESIAN END-TO-END CONTROLLERS FOR SELF
DRIVING
In the experiments considered in this paper we consider
a setting where the observation space O is given by images
from a single camera input, placed on the front centre of
the car facing forwards. The control space U is the steering
angle. Nevertheless, we should stress that the techniques
developed in this paper are general and not limited to this
scenario.
D. Data Acquisition and Processing
The experiments in this paper use the CARLA simula-
tor, a state-of-the-art, open-source simulator for autonomous
driving research [8]. However, we stress that any simulator
can be used within this framework, assuming it can simulate
car trajectories, and generate images that can be used by
the controller. All training data, which consists of (image,
steering angle) pairs, was acquired within the CARLA
simulator, either through manual driving or use of the built-
in autopilot. During experiments, we also make use of the
cars trajectory data, which is provided in the form of a list of
GPS coordinates from the simulator. Images are converted to
grayscale and scaled to a size of 64 × 48 pixels, and steering
angles (recorded between -1 and 1) are binned into intervals
of tenths. The data recorded consists of three scenarios:
a right turn on a roundabout and a straight segment of
road with and without an obstacle (stationary vehicle). It is
possible to vary the weather within the simulator, however
the weather condition in all of the training data is “clear
noon”.
We use a modified PilotNet [14] architecture for the exper-
iments in this paper. Traditionally, steering angle prediction
has been treated as a regression problem. However, it has
been shown that posing regression tasks as classification
tasks often shows improvement over direct regression train-
ing [34]. Therefore, we have modified the final layer of the
PilotNet architecture to have neurons equal to the number of
classes (variable per experiment), and a softmax activation
function.
We fix the convolutional layers and first fully connected
layer, and use the final layers for uncertainty extraction
(similarly to [35]). For MCD, we use concrete dropout
[36] on the final three layers (and leave the fourth fully
connected). For VI and HMC, we use four fully connected
layers, where the input to the first layer are the features
extracted from the final fixed network layer.
In our experiments, for an observation o we have that pi(o),
the BNN decision, is given by the most likely class. However,
we stress that other choices for pi(o) are possible according
to the particular loss function (see e.g., [6]) and the methods
presented in this paper are independent of the criteria for
assigning pi(o).
E. Network Training
This section describes how the networks for each inference
technique were trained. Full details of hyper-parameters can
be found in the code associated with this work.
MCD The cross-entropy loss function is used, along with
the ADAM optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0001 and
the dropout probabilities tuned with concrete dropout, which
converged to (0.1, 0.08, 0.08). The batch size is 16 and it
was trained for 25 epochs.
VI Features are first extracted from the final fixed layer
of the network using the weights from the MCD network
for these initial layers. Then, we impose prior distributions
on the weights of the final four, fully-connected layers.
These are normal distributions with mean 0 and variable
variance. Inference was then performed using the Edward
python library [37], and the posterior is also in the form of
a normal distribution.
HMC The prior distributions for the HMC networks are as
above, however the posterior here is an empirical distribution
based on sampling with the HMC algorithm. We use 10
steps of numerical integration prior to judging the acceptance
criteria of each sample.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe an extendable experimental set
up for computing the measures in Definition 1 and Defini-
tion 2. We first show that use of the measure in Definition 2
in conjunction with classical measures of uncertainty can
greatly increase the safety of an autonomous vehicle when
it is in unfamiliar scenarios. We then consider probabilistic
safety as defined in Definition 1 and we show that this mea-
sure can be effectively used in order to identify problematic
scenarios in which further data acquisition should occur.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
HMC Collision Avoidance Simulations
VI Collision Avoidance Simulations
MCDropout Collision Avoidance Simulations
P(safe | clear, known location) = 1.00
P(safe | clear, known location) = 1.00
P(safe | clear, known location) = 1.00
P(safe) = 0.465
P(safe) = 0.4125
P(safe) = 0.200
Fig. 1: To the left of the black line, we visualize the experimental set up. (a) Spatial distribution of cars; (b) original camera
signal; (c) input to BNN. In the centre of the figure we plot the course of the vehicle controlled by a BNN, where each row
represents a different posterior approximation (d) HMC, (e) VI, (f) MC Dropout. Each dot, representing the position of the
car during its trajectory is colored based on the uncertainty of the controller.
A. Real-time Collision Avoidance
In Figure 1, we can see an example of a collision avoid-
ance test set up. We place a vehicle 40 meters away from an
obstacle in fixed weather conditions along a single roadway.
We then train a BNN controller on data collected from
safe human driving in this scenario. Below, we describe a
general framework for performing collision avoidance which
generalizes to any scenario one would like to test. Further,
the system that we use can be implemented for any BNN that
is trained to drive autonomously, and can detect situations in
which the car is uncertain in order to improve safety.
The uncertainty-aware decision system is designed in two
stages. In the first stage, we simulate more runs of the vehicle
driving without any collision avoidance system present. We
rely only on the learned behavior of the vehicle (plots of
these runs can be seen in Figure 1). At this stage, we
are able to qualitatively understand the behavior of each
network posterior in terms of the uncertainty it produces as
it approaches the obstacle. The behavior of uncertainty can
roughly be seen in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 2.
We note that it is possible, though less desirable, to perform
this qualitative evaluation using a held-out, test data set.
Because the input we observe at time t depends on all of
the decisions made up to that time, generating safety or
uncertainty estimates based on another controllers decisions
may be inaccurate due to the potentially low probability
of ever observing those states with the current controller
under consideration. In the second stage, we use the captured
information about uncertainty in order to generate actionable
warning thresholds. For example, if we see that there is
typically a large spike in uncertainty as the car approaches
the obstacle, we can use a threshold in order to stop the car
when we experience a similar peak in the future.
We use a three tiered warning system based on real-time
decision confidence, as defined in Definition 2. That is, given
an image at time k we bin network decisions into four
categories based on the value of η2. Often times no warning
will be thrown, i.e., η2 ≥ δ1 for a given δ1 ∈ [0, 1]. However,
in the case that we are less than δ1-certain (η2 < δ1), a
standard warning (warning 1) is thrown. A severe warning
(warning 2) is thrown when the network is less that δ2-certain
(this assumes δ2 < δ1). Finally, we consider a warning
(warning 0) which is thrown when neither a severe nor
standard warning are thrown (η2 ≥ δ1), but the predictive
distribution exhibits high mutual information, above yet
another threshold, in our case 0.45. For our experiments,
the constants δ1 and δ2 are set to a threshold of 0.7 and
0.6 respectively. The actions that occur at each of these
warnings are also configurable. However, we have set up our
system such that mutual information warnings slow down the
vehicle, standard warnings slow down the vehicle and alert
the operator of potential hazard, and severe warnings cause
the car to safely brake and alert the operator that they need
to assume control of the vehicle.
Setting these thresholds requires a delicate trade-off be-
tween autonomy and safety. If the thresholds are set too
low, then the system will operate more autonomously (that
is, without asking for user intervention), however it may be
less safe. Setting the thresholds too high may be safer, but
causes the car to operate less autonomously as the user is
constantly prompted for input. In Figure 2, we show that
these sorts of collision avoidance systems can perform well
in practice. We show that we can detect and reduce the rate
of collision (the inverse of probabilistic safety), improving
the safety in unknown conditions from 0.00 (±0.05) to 0.90
(±0.05), see Figure 1. Moreover, we test that implementation
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
p(safe | unknown location ) = 0.00 p(safe | unknown location, stopping ) = 0.90
p(safe | known location, stopping ) = 1.00
MI on Approach VI Safety Simulations
VI Safety SimulationsVI Safety Simulations
Distance to Collision
Fig. 2: Demonstration of how the uncertainty-aware stopping
procedure performs. (a) Original safety of VI without stop-
ping algorithm. (b) Mutual information signal spikes as we
approach the obstacle. (c) VI safety with stopping. (d) VI
performance in a known environment with stopping.
P(safe | clear) = 0.94 P(safe | afternoon) = 0.91 P(safe | rain) = 0.88
P(safe | clear) = 0.83 P(safe | afternoon) = 0.73 P(safe| rain) = 0.71
P(safe | clear) = 1.00 P(safe | afternoon) = 0.74 P(safe | rain) = 0.00
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3: Offline safety probabilities of (a) HMC, (b) VI and
(c) MCD respectively. Each hexagon is shaded with the
probability of the car visiting that area, and the optimal
trajectory is plotted with a green line. The red lines show
safety boundaries, where outside of this is considered unsafe,
and inside is safe.
of this strategy does not affect the autonomy of the car in
known situations. For this we simulate the situation in which
the car was trained and we find that the car still operates with
safety probability 1.00, with error margin of 0.05 according
to Equation 1, and full autonomy (i.e. never stops to ask for
user to assume control of the car).
B. Probabilistic Safety Estimates
In order to measure the safety of a BNN controller in a
particular setting, one must simulate scenarios (e.g. turns,
collision avoidance, intersections) in various conditions in
order to satisfy the bound in Equation 1. Though we do
simulations in order to test the safety of a turn, running the
correct number of simulations with diverse environmental
conditions works on any scenario one would like to test. For
example, the notion of probabilistic safety is also used to
calculate the safety in Figure 1.
Figure 3 shows the test setup for probabilistic safety
estimates. We place a vehicle approximately 10 meters from
the entrance of a roundabout in fixed weather conditions.
We then collect training data using the built in autopilot.
The autopilot is set to drive the car through the roundabout,
taking the first exit. We then use our safety boundaries to
determine the probability that a specific controller will drive
safely, that is, stay within our safety boundaries. We are then
left with safety probabilities for each section of road tested,
for each controller.
While we expect the controller to be able to safely navigate
from its trained starting point to the end point in the weather
it has seen, we seek to test the robustness of posterior
distributions to changes in scenery and weather conditions
in order to also include simulations of potential worst-case
deployment performance. In row (a) of Figure 3 we see that,
while the variance can be useful in collision avoidance, the
wide variance of HMC causes a larger proportion of trajec-
tories to fall outside of the safety boundary. The estimated
probability of safety for HMC, across all weathers, was 0.766
(±0.05). Row (b) of Figure 3 reports the consistency of VI
across different weather conditions with a cumulative safety
probability estimate of 0.91 (±0.05) in this particular test
case. The main reason for lack of safety in VI was veering
into the center lane of the roundabout. Finally, in row (c)
we see the performance of MC Dropout. In the training
environment, it was the only method to achieve a perfect
safety score; however, we see the network fails to generalize
well to other weather conditions. While MC Dropout per-
forms slightly better than HMC in the more dim light of the
afternoon, it fails catastrophically in the rain. MCDropout’s
overall probabilistic safety, prior to the consideration of rain,
was 0.87. When we factor rainy environments, the overall
probabilistic safety of MCDropout falls to 0.58 (±0.05). It is
likely that if we were to retrain MC Dropout in all weather
conditions and re-run the safety analysis we would see a
perfect safety score, as we do currently with clear weather.
In this way, we can use our offline safety probability as a
guide for active learning in order to increase data coverage
and scenario representation in training data.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a framework for evaluating the safety of
end-to-end BNN controllers for self-driving cars, which
allows one to obtain uncertainty estimates for the controller’s
decisions with a priori statistical guarantees. On experiments
performed on the CARLA driving simulator we showed that
our statistical framework can be used to evaluate model
robustness to changes in weather, location, and observation
noise. Further, we illustrate how our results can be success-
fully employed to detect and avoid a high percentage of
collisions.
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